In the last article, we examined the relative value of starting hands in full and shorthanded games. To summarize, in shorthanded games implied odds are reduced, big cards take down pots unimproved, and hand domination is infrequent. Part II of this topic revolves around the blind structure. Blinds orbit quickly in a shorthanded game. At its most extreme is heads-up hold'em, where both players post a blind. In this article, we will examine heads-up preflop play so that we can review fundamental concepts before moving to larger shorthanded games.

Heads-Up Play

Heads-up play is analyzed by Sklansky and Malmuth in Hold'Em Poker for Advanced Players. If you do not own this book (and study it religiously), then you are placing yourself at a great disadvantage. The first concept offered by Sklansky and Malmuth concerns the preflop play required by the blind structure.

In a $10/20 game, the small blind has anted $5 and the big blind has anted $10. If the small blind raises, he is betting $15 to win $15. So, he must steal the blinds only 50% of the time to earn immediate profit (assuming no raising and all things are equal postflop). If the big blind folds too often, the small blind would earn a significant profit by raising 100% of the time preflop. In fact, since the small blind would also win some hands after the flop, the fold percentage required for profit is far less. In other words, blind stealing works incredibly well!

It Gets Worse…

Furthermore, the small blind has a positional advantage after the flop. Position will allow the small blind to bluff more successfully, earn extra bets with big hands, or save bets in many situations. Not only do heads-up games feature a large volume of hands, but plays such as bluffs and semibluffs hold more consequence. Consider the following examples.

Example 1.
It is a normal $2/4 heads-up game, with one exception. You must pay your opponent $20,000 if you play a hand preflop. Clearly, to keep your losses at a minimum, you would never play a hand.

Example 2.
It is the same normal $2/4 heads-up game, except you must only pay $1 if you play a hand preflop. Many holdings such as AA are still clearly profitable, but you would think twice before playing most hands, since there is a hefty fee to overcome each time you compete.

Defending the big blind is similar to example 2 above. The exact amount lost by not having position differs with the competition, but the disadvantage always exists. For each hand that goes to the flop, the player with position will benefit because they will have an enhanced ability to profitably bluff, earn an extra bet on good hands, or save a bet with bad ones. How can a big blind out of position minimize its losses or even earn a profit against such obstacles?

Defending the Big Blind

Sklansky and Malmuth suggest defending with 40% of all hands, and reraising with the top quarter of those, based on the idea that this calling/raising strategy neutralizes the preflop advantage of raising 100% of the time from the small blind. I propose that this advice is too passive. Furthermore, the percentage of hands played should be fluid, based on the competition's play after the flop as well as preflop.

Before going any further, let's repeat the authors definition of playable hands, counting up to 40%. "Any pair, any ace, any other two cards that are both nine or higher, any other straight flush combination with no gaps or just one gap (except for 42s and 32s), and any king little suited. (You might add in a few more hands such as J8s, 98, or 97.)"

Many beginning players might wonder how to figure out that these holdings represent 40% of all possible hands. It is possible to double-check the authors' work by reviewing the number of combinations of each holding. Since there are 1326 possible 2-card combinations, a hand like AA, which can be made six different ways, represents (6/1326) of all possible starting hands. In percentages, this equates to ~0.45% of all hands, or about 220:1. Two cards of unknown suits can be combined sixteen different ways, while a suited hand is only formed with four possibilities (e.g. AK, AK, AK, AK). One resource for an aspiring player who is truly interested in learning the fundamental probabilities is Hold'em's Odds Book by Mike Petriv.

Reraising Preflop

There are three main reasons for adopting a more aggressive reraising strategy to effectively combat the stealer. Reraising punishes the stealer, sets up profitable postflop play, and establishes variation.

1. Punish the opposition.
I'm not the first person to suggest reraising to slow down your opponent on future action. In fact, Sklansky and Malmuth make it apparent that it is critical for your opponent to worry that a raise will cost more than it appears. As they say, "He needs to know that he's in jeapordy of a reraise. Thus you frequently reraise for the sake of future hands, not the hand that you are holding."

But is reraising 10% of your hands enough? 10% represents the cream of the crop: AA-99 (6 possible combinations each), AK-AT(16 combinations each), KQ(16), KJs(4), KTs(4), QJs(4), JTs(4). These hands are so dominating that many of them would be 3-bet in a full ring game. Versus a steal raise, the selection is too thin.

More importantly, reraising 10% of the time will likely not even affect a blind stealing opponent who is raising 100% of the time preflop. Out of 10 hands, the stealer will immediately win the blinds 6 times, play on the flop against an out of position caller 3 times, and face a reraise only once. In this situation, even against a reraise, it becomes pretty easy for the small blind to fold if the flop doesn't hit him hard, since he knows he is competing against a premium hand.

2. Set up Flop play.
'If you're going to be in the hand to the end, you might as well get the money in early.' I'm not sure where I read or heard the above advice, but it makes a lot of sense. With a powerful hand, you want to put pressure your opponent and make him pay for the right to outdraw you. You want to earn the most money possible, and fundamentally, you want to get your money in while you are ahead. (This is an oversimplification, but it works for shorthanded play due to a concept called 'clustering'.)

Mason Malmuth wrote about shorthanded play in Poker Essays, a good book for advanced players to hone specific theories. "Concept No. 3: Be prepared to go to the river." Basically, if your hand is strong and unless the board develops in a very scary manner, you will often want to showdown. Since you will be going to the river with many hands, you should get the money in early, which makes a showdown strategy more likely to be correct and profitable in the long run.

A second factor is initiative. I mentioned above that most preflop stealers will not be affected by reraises, especially those raising 100% of the time preflop. In my experience, most opponents simply fold if the flop didn't hit their hand since they expect to be against a monster hand. Even those who do not habitually steal raise will still respect an opponent who reraised preflop. In other words, if you are the big blind and raise with a hand like JTs, you should virtually always bet on the flop, even if the flop misses entirely. Putting the pressure back on your opponent is critical. Opponents may simply concede on the flop, expecting to be against a very powerful hand and not wishing to pay a turn and river bet to see a showdown.

3. Establish variation.
The third reason to increase aggression preflop and reraise with a wider selection of hands addresses the predictability of the play. 10% narrows the possible hands considerably, and it creates an undeniable problem if the flop arrives with 3 rags. Under Sklansky and Malmuth's advice, you would be reraising with big cards 3 out of 4 times; this is simply too predictable against even average competition.

So, what is appropriate for a reraise preflop from the big blind? What if we added 88-66(6 combinations each), KJo(12), KTo(12), QJo(12), QT(16), A9s-A2s(4 combinations each), T9s(4), and 98s(4)? The total is an additional 110 hands, which progresses the amount of reraising hands to 18.25% of total hands. Notice that most of these hands can be taken to a showdown, yet they create enough variation to make any flop potentially dangerous for your adversary.

Watching the opposition

An aggressive counterstrategy is only part of the equation. You will still be calling with other hands. You will still need to vary your play to keep your opponent off your scent. I recommend slowplaying AA or KK sometimes, reraising with lesser holdings on occasion, and following up with occasionally unpredictable flop play. Keep them guessing. Meanwhile, watch your opposition. Preflop, you will adjust your standards in the same direction as your opponent. If the small blind stops raising half the time, you should not call as often, since you will too often be playing bad cards with bad position, a costly combination. Reraising is still valuable but should be reduced as well. You want to slow down against an opponent who raises only with legitimate hands.

In addition, you must consider the postflop play of your opponent. If the opponent plays very well with position: earning extra bets, staying aggressive, and following a solid bluffing strategy, then he will earn a significant advantage each hand played on the flop. With your higher postflop burden, you must adjust by folding more preflop. Against an expert, you will fold quite often (and therefore call less than Sklansky and Malmuth's recommended strategy). The important thing to note is that you will be losing money by folding the big blind more often. Repeat: YOU WILL BE VOLUNTARILY LOSING!!!! But you will lose less money folding than playing marginal hands that cost extra bets after the flop. Sometimes (often) you cannot win in the big blind of a heads-up matchup; your best choice is simply to minimize losses. Don't worry; you'll make your profits when you are in position and have the advantage.

Slow 'em Down

Finally, a good preflop game will complement the overall strategy. Getting the money in early with the best hand will help to mitigate your positional disadvantage to some degree. But the best reason to stay aggressive may be intimidation. If you can scare your opponent into slowing down, you will begin to win the blinds for free, and you will not be forced to play at a disadvantage so often. In other words, you want your opponent to stop raising your blinds. So snarl (metaphorically) and attack back! Until next time, good luck!

Mainstream poker literature often includes popular charts or groupings for hand rankings, created to measure the relative value of hands in a full ring game. Unfortunately, these helpful tools cannot be used effectively in short-handed hold'em, because they were not written to assume a short-handed structure.

The two main differences between full and 5-person games are known to most advanced players, even if they are not fully understood. First, the relative value of big offsuited cards goes up, and the relative value of drawing hands go down. Second, the blind structure forces more action. Blinds come too often, and a good player cannot just wait for a premium holding. In Part I of this article, we will focus on the first distinction.

There are three main reasons that hand rankings change so drastically when the number of players drops.

Implied Odds are reduced.
Drawing hands are often overvalued by many novices of short-handed games. For example, suitedness earns a considerable payoff by hitting a flush, but that only occurs about 3% of the time. A hand like Kx suited will flop a four flush or flush about 1/8th of the time. With a four flush on the flop, the player will only end with a flush 1/3rd of the time.

These improbable odds mean the suited hand needs to get in cheap and have multiway action to earn profit. Shorthanded poker fits neither requirement. Preflop play in 5-handed games very often involves a raise, meaning a player must pay two bets to even see the flop. On the flop, the contest is often heads-up, and the four flush loses money on every additional bet to the pot. Hence, suitedness is worth considerably less in a short-handed game. The same logic can be applied to all drawing hands. The probability of hitting a very strong hand (such as a set, straight, or flush) stays the same in both a shorthanded and a ring game, but the compensation in a short-handed pot is often inadequate.

Big cards win small pots.
It has been stated in many mainstream books that a hand like AKo has value because it can win unimproved in a heads-up match. But this concept is not just limited to hands like 'Big Slick'. There will be many hands that feature two drawing hands, and the big cards will take down the pot when both miss.

Example 1:

* Player 1: Ah 5c {small blind}
* Player 2: Jh Th {big blind}
* Flop: 4h 3s Kh. {4 small bets in the pot.}

Player 1 bets, Player 2 raises. Player 1 calls.

Turn: 6d.
Player 1 checks. Player 2 bets. Player 1 calls.

River: Qc.

Both check, and the A5o takes down the pot.

Neither player makes a mistake in the scenario above. With 7 bets in the pot already, Player 1 was correct to call on the flop with at least 6 known outs and a backdoor flush draw. Player 2 might have checked the turn, but it's not particularly pertinent to this scenario. Also, a bluff might work on the end here, but it depends on the skills of both competitors.

The bottom line is that the bigger card took down a pot unexpectedly, and Player 1 is several bets richer. It is hard to overvalue the extra small pots earned by the high card; it happens far too often in heads-up and shorthanded play to ignore.

The other advantage of big cards is that they upgrade guesswork into value bets and semibluffs. The following scenarios better illustrate the advantages allowed by high cards.

Example 2:

* Player 1 has Kh 9h. {small blind}
* Player 2 has 6s 5s. {big blind}
* Flop: Jh 3d 8c. {4 small bets in the pot}

If you are Player 1, you cannot be sure what you are up against. A bet here is a percentage play, but it's still a guess, because you cannot be sure the King-high is currently winning. Player 2 is forced to fold.

Example 3:

* Player 1 has 6s 5s. {small blind}
* Player 2 has Kh 9h. {big blind}
* Flop: Jh 3d 8c. {4 small bets in the pot}

Player 1 bets. It's a complete bluff. If Player 2 plays back, Player 1 is in trouble and will likely muck. If there is even a 25% chance of an immediate fold, Player 2 would be correct to raise. (Note: This is true regardless of what Player 2 holds, but the next scenario will illustrate why holding big cards makes this raise even more profitable.)

Example 4:

* Player 1 has 6s 5s. {small blind}
* Player 2 has Kh 9h. {big blind}
* Flop: Jh 5d 8c. {4 small bets in the pot}

Player 1 bets. It's a value bet with 3rd pair. If Player 2 plays back, they're making a mistake. But it's not much of a blunder, because Player 2 still has 6 immediate outs if a King or Nine hits, and there are several cards (Ten or any heart) that give Player 2 a strong draw on the turn.

It's easy to dismiss the choice of Player 2 because it is a -EV play, but that's an error. In short-handed poker, you will misstep sometimes. Yet, there is tremendous value in big cards because they minimize the impact of inaccuracies.

Example 5/6:

* Player 1 has 6s 5s. {small blind}
* Player 2 has Kh 9h. {big blind}
* Flop: Jh 5d Th. {4 small bets in the pot} OR
Flop: Jh 5d 9c. {4 small bets in the pot}

Player 1 bets, again believing it's a value bet with 3rd pair. However, Player 2 is the favorite on both flops. In both scenarios, Player 2 will win approximately 80% of the time. Obviously, Player 1 is in trouble.

Kh 9h is plainly a superior hand to 6s 5s heads-up. But reality shows that many losing short-handed players leak money heavily by overplaying small cards. 6s 5s is a group 5 hand in Sklansky's Hold'Em hand rankings. Kh 9h is a group 6 hand. But the examples above clearly demonstrate the original hypothesis: Hand rankings for full ring games do not work for short-handed strategy because they were not intended as short-handed strategy.

Hand domination is a much smaller factor.
Hand domination occurs when one starting hand causes apparent outs to be counterfeited in another starting hand, resulting in a very powerful advantage for the superior holding. Examples include (AA vs. AK), (AK vs. AQ), (A 5 vs. K 4), or even (KQ vs. Q9).

In a ring game, a hand such as K9 has a fairly significant chance of being dominated, even if the flop includes a King. With nine opponents (and a King on the flop), there is a 10% chance an opponent holds a KT, KJ, KQ, or AK. Against any of these combinations, K9 is drawing very slim or virtually dead. More importantly, there are no Kx hands that a normal player would hold in a full ring game, so the K9 will not earn good pots with top pair. Overall, it is a clear loser.

In a short-handed game, K9 becomes profitable in many cases. Players will often not give you credit for top pair, so top pair with any kicker goes up in value. In addition, many players will play Kx suited or will play King with a small kicker fast from the blinds when a King hits. Moreover, the chances that an opponent holds KT, KJ, KQ, or AK is greatly reduced (less than 5%), further mitigated by examining if the opponent raised or reraised preflop.

The Role of Deception
Everything up to this point has indicated that hands like 65s are highly overrated in short-handed poker. However, there are two good reasons to demonstrate strength with small cards.

First, stealing pots is a necessity in many short-handed contests, and waiting around for big cards means missing a lot of excellent stealing opportunities. If you know an opponent folds too often, it is profitable to challenge them with a wider range of hands. If you raise with 65s, your opponent will typically fail to comprehend that your real motivation for raising was to steal the pot. On the other hand, if you raised and eventually showed down a hand like J2, your opponent would likely begin calling or reraising more often, neutralizing your advantage by correcting their play.

Second, it is important to not be too predictable. If you only raise with big cards, your opponents will begin bluffing at you when rags hit the flop. Or, they will simply fold marginal hands since they know you would not raise without a strong holding. So, mixing up your play is critical. Raising with small suited connectors becomes a semibluff. You wouldn't mind if your opponent folded, but you would be just fine winning the pot with a surprising straight or two pair, which can rake in a larger pot because the flop appears harmless. In addition, mixing your play will slow down the opposition in the long run and force them to pay off your big cards more often, since they must give you credit for a wider range of potential starting hands.

Short-handed poker is mostly an online phenomenon. Shuffling a deck, even for the most experienced dealer, will always take an inordinate amount of time when compared to the instant response of a computer. Thus, shorthanded poker has seen its popularity increase with the growth of online poker. Maybe the relative novelty of online poker (and even more recent appearance of 5-handed table offerings at online poker sites) explains the minimal offerings of literature concerning short-handed poker. But the advantages of shorthanded play make it worthwhile for any aspiring player to focus significant energy studying, even if they will never seek out a short-handed game.

In this article, I will detail three essentials that provide the foundation for how short-handed play is different from ring games. Throughout this and future articles, the main focus will remain on Texas Hold 'Em, by far the most popular form of short-handed play.

Fundamental #1:
Short-handed play is fast (high average hands per hour). This might seem self-explanatory, but its impact is so large that it might not be considered fully at first glance. There are several factors that make online short-handed Texas Hold'Em a very fast game. Online poker is well known to allow players to average twice to three times more hands per hour than its live B&M counterpart.

Shuffling is instantaneous, players can act before their turn, dealers never have to split pots or call the floor, and poker software interfaces let players act more quickly than in a B&M cardroom. And these advantages of online poker are magnified at shorthanded games. Many hands end quickly through blind stealing or folds on the flop, so the instant shuffling has an increased impact. Of course, there are also fewer players who must make decisions. All these effects multiply, leading to averages of 150-200+ hands per hour in many cases.

But what does this mean to you, the aspiring winner? Lots and lots of money, most importantly. Poker is a game of many small edges. The more good decisions a winner makes (+EV decisions), the more money they earn. Simple, eh? Well, short-handed games allow a winner to make more decisions per hour than in a 10-handed game for two main reasons. The most straightforward (but common to all forms of online poker) is simply what we discussed above. There are more hands played per hour. However, a lesser considered reason is the looseness of the typical short-handed player. Due to the high price of the blinds, each player will take part in more hands. More hands played will result in more decisions to be made and each of these decisions is an opportunity for the good player.

So, there's the prospect of making a lot of money fast. But beware. The incredibly fast pace of shorthanded play is a double-edged sword. Many players complain of the very high variance of short-handed tables. On one hand, luck actually plays a smaller role in theory due to the higher number of decision opportunities per hour. To explain this phenomenon, I'll consider a case where a person is flipping a coin. If one person flips a coin only 10 times, there is a significant chance the percentages of 'heads' will vary greatly. It wouldn't be so shocking to see 60 or 70% of all flips end in 'heads' (or tails).

However, if that same person flipped a coin 100 times, the chances of 'heads' coming up 70% of the time are extremely small. The math needed to demonstrate the actual probabilities in our two scenarios is just an expansion of simple arithmetic, but too cumbersome for the purpose of this article. The point is that while luck swings to both good and bad players alike, the variance in general will be lower as more decisions are made.

If we've proven that luck is a smaller factor, why would a high variance be a normal complaint? Simply put, the game often proceeds faster than players can adjust. While conditions can change quickly in poker under any set of circumstances, the damage that can be done in shorthanded play is amplified. Let's say you are playing what is normally a winning strategy for your game. If an opponent crafts a solid strategy capitalizing on your weaknesses, you may not realize you are being outplayed for quite a few hands. The longer it takes to counter, the more money you will lose.

In other words, since your opponents have changed, the decisions you make will have negative expectations. The speed of play may mean that a lot of hands pass before you even realize what is happening. Furthermore, shorthanded play can often be very volatile and unpredictable, for reasons I will highlight in the next section and in future articles. Decisions will be closer to marginal in general than they would be in other games because even great short-handed players are forced to do a lot of educated guessing with very imperfect information.

Fundamental #2:
Short-handed play is usually loose and aggressive. At the time I am writing this article, there are six 10-handed $3/$6 games of Hold'Em at a popular online poker site. The average pot size is $32 exactly. At the same time, there are three 5-handed $3/$6 games at the same site, with an average pot size of $27. Why such a small difference? The answer lies in an oft-used phrase, "Poker begins as a fight for the blinds." In a 10-handed game, tight play is so critical that it often is the biggest difference between winners and losers in a low-limit game. One can afford to wait for premium hands before entering a pot. In a 5-handed game, keeping the same tight standards will be suicide to your bankroll. Each player will pay one of the blinds 40% of the time, constantly putting in money without any guarantee of even reasonable cards.

Sklansky and Malmuth point out the need for far looser standards pre-flop in what is pretty much the only available literature that focuses on short-handed play, Hold 'Em Poker for Advanced Players. As they show with basic math, a good short-handed player will need to play at least 40% of their hands preflop in many. Short-handed players will enter a lot more pots and see a lot more flops than their ring-game counterparts. In addition, the nature of Texas Hold 'Em rewards aggressive play, and this is never more true than in short-handed play. Why is being aggressive so critical?

Consider a common situation where a player raises preflop in a short-handed game and the big blind calls, making it heads-up on the flop. Four small bets are already in the pot. First, a little mathematical background. A player with a non-pocket pair will only improve to a pair about one-third of the time. This average is decreased if one's opponent has a similar holding, such as A9 vs A8. If a player has connectors, such as QJ, QT, Q9, there is an additional chance of between about 7-11% that the flop will result in a straight or open-ended straight draw. A player with two suited cards will flop a four-flush or flush 12% of the time(by the way, a player with suited connecters such as JTs will flop either a four-flush, open-ended straight, or completed hand about 16% of the time). In other words, your opponent will flop a good draw or pair less than HALF the time, but the same applies to you.

After a bet, there would be five small bets at stake. Five small bets is not enough to justify a gut straight draw or draw at overcards without extraordinary implied odds. So, if a player holds QJ and the flop is 2d 5h 8c for example, they will have a very difficult time calling even a single bet. Drawing towards overcards in this case is not justified by the pot odds (there is a 6:41 chance of improving, or about 7 to 1 against making a pair on the turn). Also note that if that QJ is going against a set, two pair, or is dominated by a hand such as AQ, AJ, KQ, KJ, etc, then it does not even have 6 outs and may be drawing virtually dead. The QJ is in a position of vulnerability. A call is marginal at best.

To capitalize on this vulnerability, good short-handed players will often bluff at a ragged flop (or any flop for that matter) since they are receiving 4-to-1 odds for their bluff and their opponent will not have connected with the flop approximately 50% of the time. In response, a good player will often raise back, as a bluff or semibluff, or with as little as 3rd pair. After all, folding too often makes the bluff profitable, so a good player must fight back to keep from being bullied. Now, this process can often result in a conflict that looks more like a game of "chicken" than poker (i.e. two players bullying each other trying to force the other to fold).

This power game creates some difficult decisions for the short-handed player, but the main premise is that most play is aggressive and loose. There is a wider variety of hands played and a wider set of strategies used than in a 10-handed game. Bluffs, semibluffs, semibluff reraises, check-raise bluffs, and bluff raising can all be found at online 5-handed tables because THEY ARE OFTEN EFFECTIVE. In turn, players with legitimate hands bet, raise, and reraise with far more abandon than in a full ring game, and their opponents will raise, reraise, or call with a far wider range of hands. This means a lot of money is going into each pot, often before the turn, even though the action is usually heads-up. It's easy to correlate how the increased range of hands and aggressiveness results in more 'educating guessing' and fewer clear-cut decisions for a good player.

Fundamental #3:
To win at short-handed poker, you must be observant. I might be a poker purist, but I believe good poker should include a high degree of bluffing, aggression, and guts. That's certainly how mass society views the game. But the truth in full ring games, especially at low limits, is that bluffs are usually bad plays, tightness is often a huge factor separating winners and losers, and guts have far less to do with how much is won than Hollywood would ever have us believe.

Utilizing a good conservative strategy, staying patient, understanding pot odds, and some basic card reading skills are the main tools of winners. Online players (including a lot of professionals) sometimes play two or three 10-handed games at the same time because they can win by simply using a straightforward, tight strategy. The same decisions come up repeatedly, and straightforward play takes the cash. These professionals win even though they don't know the tendencies of each player because the advantage of knowing each players tendencies is reduced.

I am not attempting to say that being observant is unimportant in full-ring games. But the fact remains that especially in low limit games, many professionals win without being observant because it is less important than other skills such as card selection (tightness).

On the other hand...
In short-handed games, a winning player does one fundamental thing that sets him or her apart from the losing player. They adjust their own play to their opponents to capitalize on their opponents' mistakes. Being observant and adjusting one's playing style is the most important requirement for being a winning short-handed player. First, with a higher rate of hands played, an observant player can pick up the tendencies and playing style of opponents much more quickly.

Of course, there are many, many individual inclinations that can be exploited with a good counterstrategy (e.g. a player might fold too often to raises or check raises, they might not call enough in the blinds or they might call too much, or a player might fold too often on the end). There seem to be almost infinite possibilities. It might seem obvious, but almost every tendency can be countered. And in shorthanded play, strong card reading, psychology, and observation skills will result in opportunities for +EV players quickly and often.

All a winning player has to know is how to read those tendencies quickly and counter them effectively. But of course, therein lies the rub. Reading trends and understanding other players can be very difficult, and finding the best defense is harder yet. And in the real world, your opponents will not always be predictable. They will vary their play or will adjust to your counterstrategies. Your goal is to prepare ahead, and be ready to adjust quicker than your opponent. To be a winning player, you will always be one step ahead, outguessing, outthinking, and outplaying each opponent.

The subject of short-handed play is so complex and rich because it is in many ways completely different than the full-ring counterpart. There may not be a lot of shorthanded literature available to offer a straightforward strategy that wins, but the relative newness of the game is not the only reason. Instead, shorthanded poker is exceptional because each scenario is distinct, and a winning player, more than anything else, must adjust to each situation uniquely. Until the next article, good luck.

I received an email early in January regarding heads-up strategy. Tom asked, "How much is being in position worth? Or to put it another way, how often should you be defending your blinds?" In the last article, I examined reraises from the big blind. In this article, I will focus on how often you should be calling from the big blind.

Before I begin, let's repeat Sklansky and Malmuth's recommendations in Hold'Em Poker for Advanced Players. They suggest calling at least 40% of the time, reraising with the top quarter of these holdings. They include "Any pair, any ace, any other two cards that are both nine or higher, any other straight flush combination with no gaps or just one gap, and any king little suited. (You might add in a few more hands such as J8s, 98, or 97.)"

As I noted in the last article, I firmly trust the guidances in Hold'Em Poker for Advanced Players along with Theory of Poker. I believe Sklansky and Malmuth are brilliant teachers and excellent poker authors who take their material very seriously. However, I believe they use unsound logic to determine the number of playable hands in a short-handed game, and I don't feel our differences in opinion are insignificant. Sklansky and Malmuth have an irrefutible reputation that is well deserved. Therefore, I am not questioning their character, skill, brilliance, or credibility. It is only my intention to prove that in this one exceptional case, Sklansky and Malmuth's advice is flawed.

Could Sklansky and Malmuth be wrong?
The analysis used by Sklansky and Malmuth to find 40% does not quite make sense, and it can help indicate why current theory on short-handed play sometimes fails to designate the best strategy. Sklansky and Malmuth point out that in a $10/20 game, with the preflop raiser risking $15 to win $15, the raiser must steal the blinds only 50% of the time to make an immediate profit (assuming no reraises).

On one hand, they point out correctly that "{the small blind} is entitled to a profit because he has position on you and because you have a larger blind than he does." On the other hand, they follow up by suggesting, "The idea is to keep his profit to a minimum. This means that when the player on the button raises a lot you must call (or reraise) a lot." Herein lies the fallacy. Sklansky and Malmuth are saying that you should call because your opponent will make money if you don't call. Makes sense, right? If your opponent makes money (maximizes his profit), you must be losing too much, right? Let's recall an example from last week.

Example 1:
$10/20 heads-up game. Blinds $5/10.
You have AhAc.
Your opponent flips over 7c2s and raises preflop.
There are 3 small bets ($15 total) in the pot. But there's a catch. It will cost you $20,000 to play your hand due to some vicious house rules. Should you call? Of course not. It does not matter that your opponent makes $5 stealing your blind. Even though the opponent would lose money if you played your pair of Aces (and thus maximizes profit when you fold), it is still correct for you to fold because the only relevant point is that you lose much, much less (minimizing your losses) by folding.

Conclusion: Don't worry about the odds of the preflop raiser. Your only concern is whether a call or raise has positive expectation. We'll use some more examples to crystallize this argument.

Example 2:
$3/6 heads-up game. Blinds $1/$3.
To steal, the small blind raises $5 to win $4.
Using simple arithmetic, we calculate that the preflop raiser needs to steal the blinds 55% of the time to make an immediate profit, a considerable increase over the 50% needed in the $10/20 game. If your goal was only to counter your opponent's strategy, you could call less since you would only need to defend 45% of the time. Should you therefore play differently? No. As a big blind, you're facing the exact same situation in both games.

In the $10/20 game, there is $30 in the pot, and you must call $10.
3:1 ratio.
In the $3/6 game, there is $9 in the pot, and you must call $3.
3:1 ratio.
Also note that the small blind is still raising 100% of the time, so his potential holdings have not changed in frequency.

Example 3:
$10/20 3-handed game.
Blinds $5/10.
Again, we assume no reraising. Our assumptions are helpful to keep the playing field even in our comparisons of heads-up and 3-handed games. The button is raising 100% of the time, attempting to steal the blinds ($20 to win $15). Small blind folds. There is $35 in the pot, and you must call $10. 3.5:1 ratio.

Sklansky and Malmuth suggest that since the small blind is also defending, the big blind needs to call 70% as often as it would in a heads-up game. This advice is where I differ the most. As big blind in a 3-handed game, you have better odds to call then you would in a heads-up game, and with the small blind's cards in the muck, the proper play should clearly include more calling, not less. Remember, the button is still raising 100% of the time, and even if you assume the small blind is more likely to fold small cards, the distribution of cards that the button is raising does not change much.

Calling from the Big Blind
So, how often should you be defending your blinds? To figure that out, we only need to consider which hands are profitable to call. A reraise will affect how much profit will be won, not whether the hand should be played. In other words, both raising and calling will have +EV, but one play makes more profit than the alternative. After a certain point, raising becomes less profitable than calling. At another point, calling will incur a loss, and the hand should be folded. Last article, I argued for reraising with approximately the top 17% of all hands, although that number depends on certain factors. Now, we will examine how many hands should be called, again assuming that your big blind is raised 100% of the time. We will examine three circumstances: heads-up, 3-handed, and heads-up when the big blind has position.

Heads-up (Small blind has position.)
The irony of Sklansky and Malmuth's analysis is that even though the reasoning behind the recommendation is imperfect, playing 40% of hands in the big blind is close to correct against an opponent of equal skill. The exact number is impossible to discern, because it depends on the skill of both you and your opponent. If you are a complete novice, but your opponent is a novice also, the disadvantage of being out of position is lessened. If you are an expert, but your opponent is also an expert, the disadvantage of being out of position is magnified.

My recommendation is to tend towards a tighter strategy for several reasons. First, the 40%+ strategy includes many marginal hands such as J8s, 97, 64s, and K3s. While these hands appear to have sufficient pot odds, they also have two fundamental problems. They will not hit any of the flop approximately 40-50% of the time and will give up on the flop. Also, when they hit the flop with a pair, it will often be a very exposed position, susceptible to a well-timed bluff or semibluff. Since so much of today's opposition relies heavily on bluffs and semibluffs, hands that are exposed to these moves will pay a significant penalty after the flop.

Finally, these marginal hands are more likely to hit and still finish behind, either because the opponent has flopped a higher pair, or because the opponent draws out on the turn or river. The vulnerability of these hands can be reduced to some degree with strong play, especially in position where free card plays are available. Out of position, they will lead to some of the toughest decisions to be made in short-handed games, and these tough decisions will cause even experts to make mistakes.

The other reason to lean towards a tighter strategy involves the overall aggression you will want to incorporate into your post-flop style. You should be reraising preflop 17+% of the time. Coupled with postflop aggression, consistently revealing strong cards will likely lead to successful bluffs and semibluffs, as well as having the general effect of slowing down your competition (which is rarely a bad thing). While it seems that an opponent could thwart your strategy by simply giving up on the flop without a big hand, the reality is that you will either get action with your big hands or win with your bluffs/semibluffs more than your fair share, depending on how your opposition adjusts.

3-handed
We should assume the small blind has folded to be able to compare fairly. In Hold'Em for Advanced Players, Sklansky and Malmuth state, "you need to realize that the little blind should be aware that the big blind may also call. Consequently he should only play his better hands. Thus the little blind should play about half as often as the big blind, and their combined playing fequency should be only a little more than it was for the big blind when the game was heads-up. In other words the big blind should play approximately 70 percent as often as before, and the little blind should play approximately 40 percent as often as the big blind played in the previous case." We will discuss the small blind's quandary another time, but the key for now is that this advice is incorrect for the big blind.

As a big blind, you do not care what "should" happen. Nor should it concern you that the small blind did not have a playable hand. The only important items are (a) the skill of the button player, (b) the likely raising hands from the button, and (c) the pot odds you are receiving. In both (a) and (b), there is no difference from the heads-up example. However, the pot odds have increased. It is straightforward that you should play more hands out of your big blind since the pot size has increased for your call. I would recommend calling with 40-45% of hands in this situation.

Remember, your real concern is not how much your opponent is winning or losing. It is only how much you are winning or losing. The two matters are not necessarily equivalent.

Heads-up (Big blind has position.)
This position is unique and should only occur when everyone has folded to the small blind in a 3-handed or larger game. If the small blind raises 100% of the time, how much should you call? In this scenario, we continue to assume an average player raising 100% of the time, as well as the same 3:1 pot odds. However, now the big blind will have position post-flop.

Obviously, position makes a tremendous difference, with the advantage yielding dividends immediately on the flop since you will be able to gain information about your opponent. If your position will earn an edge, and you have 3:1 pot odds, it should seem obvious that you can defend very liberally against an opponent who raises 100% of the time.

Personally, I would play about two-thirds of all hands (sometimes more since I tend to make good use of position), as you should find a significant profit in several ways, such as earning extra bets when you hit your hand, picking up pots when your opponent misses, buying free cards, and many more. You wouldn't mind winning ½ a small bet (and saving your big blind) when your opponent folds, but if he is raising 100% of the time, you will turn a tidy profit by taking advantage of position. Some hands I would call include: QXs, JXs, T7s, T6s, 96s, 85s, 74s, J8o, T8o, T7o, K8o-K4o, Q8o-Q5o, 87o, 76o, and 65o. Of course, this assumes my opponent is raising 100% of the time preflop. In reality, I don't see players make that mistake from the small blind above the $3/6 limit (and even then it is fairly rare).

Learning to Think for Yourself
In conclusion, this has been a very difficult article for me to write. When I began, I re-examined correct big blind play and compared it to Sklansky and Malmuth's recommendations. I found some similarities, but ultimately concluded that the advice I read in Hold'Em for Advanced Players was based in part on faulty premises. The concept of playing to reduce the opponent's profit can go too far. But even the best strategists and theoreticians can be wrong sometimes, and so each idea should be examined on its merits, even when it is the advice of authors who are "correct" 99.9% of the time. After all, whether you win or lose does not depend on what you've read as much as it depends on what you learned and how much it helps you think.

So far, I have spent nearly ten articles showing that even something as simple as preflop decision making is still an area where a huge divergence in play separates winning and losing players. However, preflop strategy is not what most divides winners and losers. Instead, winners take advantage of two skills above all else: reading hands and taking advantage of position.

It's very hard to teach somebody to read hands well. Playing experience, not study, will help in the pursuit of this skill. In shorthanded poker, there is a wide range of hands that even an expert must believe an opponent is holding. On the other hand, there are a finite number of "expert plays" that take advantage of position. The winning player employs these tools at the correct times with the correct frequency to maximize profit. Today, we'll look at one commonly used gambit employed by winning shorthanded players: raising the turn with the intention of checking the river, a tactic I dub simply the "Turn Raise."

In shorthanded poker especially, a player will hold a medium strength hand after the flop and be faced with some awkward judgments. Against an opponent holding a wide range of possible hands, a medium strength hand is often too powerful to fold. The base play would be to simply call to the river.

However, there are four ambitions that underscore a more aggressive approach on the turn: to avoid giving free cards, to maximize winnings, to minimize losses, and to win pots with inferior cards. Let's start by taking a look at what happens with the typical "call down" approach.

The Call Down approach
Example 1. $10/20. $45 in pot. Button holds JhTh.
BB checkraises the flop. The Button calls.
Board: 5d Td 8c Qd. $85 in pot

Often, you will find yourself in a position similar to the one above. On the flop, your opponent shows strength by checkraising, but they could be making a move with as little as a straight draw, smaller pair, or even a pair of tens with no kicker. On the other hand, the big blind might be holding two diamonds, AT, KT, QT, T8, or a set. The big blind may even have been semibluffing with a hand such as AQ or Q8, and now they will be in the lead. So the button is in a predicament. Clearly, there is enough chance that the pair of tens is winning for this hand to see a showdown. Also, against many of the above hands, the JhTh has outs even if it behind on the turn. Let's examine what happens if the button only calls the turn.

Example 1A. $10/20. $85 in pot. Button holds JhTh.
The BB bets the turn. The Button calls. $125 in pot.
Board: 5d Td 8c Qd Ah.

First, let's assume the big blind checks on the river. Now, the button has a tough decision. Bet or check? Will the big blind call an additional bet with a smaller pair? A bet here on the river is thin value at best, and so the button is forced to make a decision that could easily be wrong.

Let's assume the big blind bets the river. The button is in no better shape. After all, most good players in the big blind would realize that the button has to hold some sort of hand, and besides, what could the big blind be betting as a bluff? So, the question becomes, "What are the odds the big blind bets out with lower than a pair of tens?" It's a tough decision that the button would probably be happy to avoid.

Example 1B. $10/20. $85 in pot. Button holds JhTh.
The BB bets the turn. The Button calls. $125 in pot.
Board: 5d Td 8c Qd 2d.

What a horrible river card! The 4th diamond on the river has created lots of problems for the button's pair of tens. After all, the BB might just bluff on the river with a busted straight draw or smaller pair, even without a diamond. Or, the BB might check-call with any hand beating the button but not containing a diamond. Either way, the JhTh is paralyzed.

Example 1C. $10/20. $85 in pot. Button holds JhTh.
The BB bets the turn. The Button calls. $125 in pot.
Board: 5d Td 8c Qd 6h.

Is that river card a brick, or did it make a straight for the opponent's 97? Or maybe two pair: sixes and fives or eights and sixes? So, now there are two problems. The button still has to make a tough decision on the river, bet or check, call or fold. But also, we see how the big blind has been given the opportunity to catch a winning second pair or straight, often when it would have folded if pressure had been applied.

The Turn Raise Approach
Example 2. $10/20. $85 in pot. Button holds JhTh.
The BB bets the turn. The Button raises. $145 in pot (BB must call $20)
Board 5d Td 8c Qd.

We have a different scenario in Example 2 then any of the examples above because initiative is now in the hands of the button, not the big blind. The button's raise screams "I have a big hand." Despite the big blind's flop checkraise (which I grant doesn't mean as much as it does in a full game) the button is demonstrating strength.

And the truth is that the button does have strength. A pair of tens with jack kicker is not bad at all, especially heads-up, and a nine offers three or four extra straight outs against many holdings. But the real value of this play is that the turn card is scary to almost everything the big blind could hold. The queen is top card so any pair of tens, eights, or fives has to be worried. And the third diamond is going to be scary to anybody not holding the completed flush. So, the turn raise by the button freezes the big blind and forces a tricky choice.

* 3-bet with T8?
* Call with KT?
* Call with T9?
* Call with 87?

The big blind is going to make some mistakes in this precarious position. Frequently, a player will fold a hand such as T9, figuring the (3) Jack outs are no good. Some will even fold KT without a diamond. With hands such as the 87 or 65, the odds of improving to two pair or three of a kind is 5:39, about 1:8. With 1:7.25 odds, it would not be much of a mistake for the 87 or 65 to call, if they knew the two pair would be good. So, the button wouldn't mind those hands folding either.

If the big blind holds a small diamond and knew the flush would be good if a fourth diamond fell, it would always have sufficient odds to call. So, hands such as 8d6c have more than enough odds to call; yet, many big blind players will fold that 8d6c against a turn raise because the turn raise shows strength and the big blind cannot know the flush would be good.

The turn raise solves our button's problem on the river as well. If any kind of scare card arrives, the button can simply check down on the end, which was our intention from the beginning. If another ten or a non-diamond nine falls on the river, the JT might bet again, earning an extra bet with trips or a straight. So, let's do a quick summary:

* Better hands may often fold to a turn raise, especially if the turn card is scary.
* Smaller pairs will often make bad folds when there were sufficient odds to call.
* Drawing hands will pay the maximum on the turn and lose a big bet whenever the draw fails to hit.
* Hands that were ahead on the turn (such as KT in the example above) will win no extra money when the JT fails to improve (JT loses 1 big bet on the turn and the river if it just calls; it loses 2 big bets on the turn when employing the turn raise. No gain/loss.)
* Hands that were ahead on the turn often lose an extra bet when the JT improves on the river.

Combined, that makes the turn raise a very powerful play. Against most opponents, it's a no-lose proposition. But there are some weaknesses to the play, just like any other.

Weaknesses and Defense of the Turn Raise
First of all, to set up the play I am describing, it is assumed that the button is already raising on the turn with their most powerful hands. Raising the turn is fairly normal with strong hands due to the double bets on fourth street. But if you're the type of player who always waits to the river or goes to war on the flop, then the "turn raise" will become transparent to observant players.

Secondly, the "turn raise" can be defended by a strong, aggressive player who will 3-bet the turn. Let's look at our example below to illustrate the button's dilemma against a 3-bet.

Example 3. $10/20. $85 in pot. Button holds JhTh.
The BB bets the turn. The Button raises and the BB reraises. $205 in pot.
Board 5d Td 8c Qd.

What could a reraise mean? Usually, it means a superior hand such as a completed flush, straight, or set. The button has an easy fold. After all, JhTh likely has between 3 and 0 outs. With 10.25:1 odds, a call would require at least 4 clean outs. But what if the big blind is a hyperaggressive maniac who is just as likely to have Ad9h, AhQh, 9d9h, or even less? Suddenly the button with JhTh will often have more than 4 outs or may even be ahead. The "turn raise" is not as effective against a hyperaggressive player. Instead, the simple calldown approach may be best, especially if the hyperaggressive big blind will continue all bluffs.

Also, the turn card must be dangerous in some way for the "turn raise" to be effective against a good opponent.

Example 4. $10/20. $85 in pot. Button holds JhTh.
The BB bets the turn. The Button raises. $145 in pot (BB must call $20)
Board 5d Td 8c 2h.

With a complete blank on the turn, many of the natural advantages of the "turn raise" are lost. Most players in the big blind will know the turn card did not assist anybody. So, good players will look at their T8, 55, AT, KT, QT, AA, KK, or QQ, and they will reraise, easily reading the button's raise on the turn for what it is. The 3-bet on the turn is a pretty clear indicator that the button is behind, and the number of outs afforded to the JhTh is questionable, so probably the button will fold (correctly). Therefore, the JhTh will have lost opportunities to win the whole pot when a Jack or Ten do give the button a winning hand versus one pair or a smaller two pair.

It should be noted that the JhTh has few or zero outs against these strong holdings, and therefore the proper play (if the button knew how formidable the big blind's hand was) would be to simply fold the turn, but we're assuming that folding with top pair was never seriously considered (because the button does not know how strong the big blind is). Instead, our options are: Call 2 big bets with the "calldown" approach or Raise to 2 big bets immediately on the turn. The button does not save money either way when losing.

In other words, the weak turn card has several impacts.

* Hands such as KT will not fold and may even reraise.
* Smaller pairs and draws are far less likely to fold improperly, since their outs will all appear clean.
* The JT will lose some opportunities to suckout and win the whole pot.

Obviously, not all turn cards are created equal, especially when we must consider the best time to utilize the "turn raise." A raise might still be correct on the turn with a blank turn card, but much more rarely and for different reasons than we are discussing today.

A final defense to the "turn raise" that can be employed by solid players in the big blind is to call the raise on the turn and immediately follow with a bet on the river. In fact, against a player who uses the "turn raise" strategy too much, it can be profitable for the big blind to bluff on the river when any scare card falls. If the button is against such a solid opponent capable of making this sort of bluff or value bet on the river, I have two bits of advice. First, don't use the "turn raise" nearly as often. Second, reconsider the table you're playing and look for greener pastures.

The Turn Raise vs. The Semibluff Raise
Let's look at one final example, to contrast a semibluff raise with the "turn raise" maneuver I have been describing.

Example 5. $10/20. $85 in pot. Button holds KdJh.
The BB bets the turn. The Button raises. $145 in pot (BB must call $20)
Board 5d Td 8c Qd.

If the button raises here, it is for a wholly different reason than before. It's important to realize that this example is not the same as the ones above because the straight draw and flush draw combined does not make this a medium strength hand on the turn. It is King-high. With the 2nd nut flush draw and a straight draw to boot, the button holds a powerful semibluffing hand. Against almost all opponents, a raise would be in order. However, there are two opponents where it would not be correct: hyperaggressive maniacs and loose callers. The hyperaggressive opponent creates the same problem we discussed above. The loose caller will not fold on the turn to make the bluff profitable but will still 3-bet with a made flush (and maybe other hands such as a set or top two pair). Why risk putting in another 2 big bets before the river? Even with 15 outs, the KJ will still only win 34% of the time.

I hope you find the "turn raise" useful. It's a powerful ploy that can be managed in more than just shorthanded games. Against the appropriate opponents, this "expert play" can be lethal.

"Vary your play." Those three words are like a sacred mantra, chanted down by more authors than I care to visualize. Those three words are treated as gospel by thousands of poker players every day. Because it is said so often and practiced even more, the sanctity of the advice often goes unquestioned. But is it really such a sacred concept after all?

The Losing Psychology

Why do losing players continue to lose? There are only a handful of plausible explanations. Maybe the losing player doesn't care about winning, or they aren't willing to put in the time to learn, or they don't know where to learn. Maybe the losing player fails to observe others, lacks necessary patience, or simply tilts at the first sign of bad luck. To each of these players, the instruction "Vary your play" must sound wonderful. After all, it's a simple concept and easy to implement. It requires little patience, since one can play extra hands in the name of 'variety.' It justifies tilting, explaining those bad raises or calls away. "In any case", the tilter thinks, "I'm just mixing up my play." It is some of the most undemanding advice available in the poker world, because everybody can be "unpredictable," and they don't even really need to know how to play.

There have been multiple networks showing celebrities compete in poker tournaments for their favorite charities. An education in solid poker play this is not, but there is some entertainment value, especially if you enjoy poker for the sake of poker. When they were asked about their style, many of the celebrities stated something to the effect of, "Well, I have no clue what I'm doing, so that will make me really unpredictable. I figure that's a huge advantage." Of course, this sort of logic is flawed (and humorous). But it does give an introspective look into the thought process of many beginning players who feel that "unpredictability" is a "huge advantage."

In this article, we will somewhat debunk the "Vary your play" motto. I will argue that it is an idea that only applies intermittently to specific sets of players. In effect, we will change the slogan to "Vary your play IF…" Figuring out when to vary your play will separate the losing players using unpredictability as an excuse from the winning players using unpredictability as a weapon.

Reflecting the Wrong Image

Let's begin with the fundamental assumption that there is a 'correct' way to play. I believe strongly that there is in fact a correct style, and that style is known as tight/aggressive. In order to be tight and aggressive, a winning player will naturally play tighter than most of their competition, and a winning player will bet, raise, or reraise more effectively than their competition. In addition, the tight/aggressive player will regularly show down winning hands. There is nothing a winning player can do to change these simple truths. And eventually, somebody will notice. But the reality is that most players will in fact never notice. There are several reasons the tight/aggressive player escapes detection.

First, most players are unobservant. Online opponents might play 2 or more tables, read their email, visit their favorite website, or watch TV in the background. There is also a high turnover on most online games, with players changing tables or limits at a whim. Some players show up to play as little as ten minutes before work, errands, or the new episode of their favorite sitcom. Even at live games, most players only notice hands shown down at the end, and even then they might not pay heed unless they were the one losing the pot. Since most pots are won by a high-quality hand, it may not even register as unusual when one player consistently shows down good hands to take down large pots. In fact, such a trend might be taken as evidence of that player's good fortune. Note: You could encourage this point of view by occasionally 'admitting' that the deck is "running your over."

Second, luck will play a role in mixing up one's play. No matter how tight one plays, they will occasionally get streaks of five or more hands where they start with premium holdings. Raising the pot several times in a row could brand a player as loose/aggressive, because few players would suspect that all those consecutive hands were in fact properly played.

Finally, we come to the other underlying problem with loose calls or raises. To affect your image, you must show down your hand. Consider how often a hand like 96s misses the flop. Is it worth "advertising" your phantom loose tendencies if you must make several bad plays to show your hand? Remember, if you consistently take hands too far and bluff too much in the name of "unpredictability", you are no longer playing tight/aggressive. While trying to deceive people into believing you are a loose/aggressive or loose/passive player, you may in fact become one! Even when you finally show down a poor hand, your opponents must notice your play and make a change in how they play against you. Also, if they reason deeply enough to consider that you might play an extra hand to "vary your play," you have lost all advantage. In other words, a player good enough to pay attention could very well be good enough to see through your ruse. A player not good enough to see through your deception may not notice your 'bad play' in the first place.

Earning a Bigger Pot

It is often pointed out that it might be occasionally correct to limp-reraise with pocket Aces, or to raise with T9s from an early position, or a myriad of other plays contrary to standard practice. In fact, such advice is correct in specific circumstances. For example, if one or more players was raising every hand preflop (but not reraising), limping Aces with the intention of reraising might earn additional profit. Or, if the game was exceptionally tight, suited connectors might profit immediately because the chance of stealing the blinds is high (turning a marginal call/fold into a profitable raise). However, in these scenarios, the profit earned by playing the hand unconventionally is immediate. All this proves is that one must adjust their play to the game. The "correct" strategy has changed because there are extreme conditions.

I have no quarrel with the need to adjust one's play to earn as much money as possible, dependent on game conditions. However, if there is no immediate profit earned from a misleading play, then we are back to depending on our opponents' observation skills to earn extra bets later in the session. If a limp-reraise with pocket Aces saves your opponents from making significant mistakes after the flop, the initial profit preflop may not actually increase overall profit. If none of your opponents will give you credit for strength when you raise from early position anyways, why raise with a weak hand to fool them?

Limit poker is a game with finite edges. An opponent's gaffe will result in a relatively small, fixed loss. So, the profit earned when hitting a miracle flop with a substandard hand is far outweighed by the losses incurred when the flop misses or gives the substandard hand a second-best hand. For example, if a player gives up a small bet (or more) five times out of six by limping with 74s in early position, they are going to have an impossible struggle to earn enough when they finally win a pot (while not losing much when second-best). And remember, without trying to make questionable moves, even tight/aggressive players will sometimes lay a bad beat on their opponent or make a play which appears to be incorrect. Most players will not analyze the point of view of the tight/aggressive player, so they will chalk up the bad beat or 'bad reraise' as the play of a flawed but fortunate player.

Two Alternative Forms of Variation

There are alternatives to making inferior moves for the sake of future gains one hopes to earn. One alternative is to adjust to each specific player. I can hear you saying now, "Wait a minute! Wasn't I supposed to be doing that anyways?" The answer is 'Absolutely.' And that is the point. If you play possum (check-call some marginal hands or slowplay big hands) with one opponent because they are repeatedly bluffing, but then you immediately raise against another opponent because they are too tight/passive, then you have just projected two entirely different playing styles to the table. Imagine how confused even an observant opponent must be.

There is another even less complicated option. Change poker rooms, change games, or change limits. In my opinion, one of the greatest assets to a poker player is their anonymity. First of all, most players need zero effort to protect their anonymity. They may not play more than a few hours a week at one or maybe two games at a time. Likely, those players are simply lost in the shuffle. However, if a player competes many hours a week, often at multiple games, then eventually others (especially good, observant players) will recognize them. Their tight/aggressive style will be noted by the better opponents, who will take advantage by avoiding confrontations or making a few extra strong moves saved only for a solid player willing to lay down a good hand.

The solution is simple. Use multiple online sites. There are many online poker rooms that advertise on Poker Pages, including Paradise Poker, Party Poker, Bugsy's Club, True Poker, Palace Poker, Poker Room, Planet Poker, InterCasino Poker, Empire Poker, and Pacific Poker. I have not played at some of these sites, but I have also played at others not listed above. The nearly universal similarities among these sites is that they offer deposit bonuses and regularly have Texas Hold'em games available. Why not hold accounts with multiple sites and multiple handles? You can play as LuckyGuy1000 at one room, but RunningDeuces22 at another. Since you can switch back and forth between the accounts regularly, nobody gets too familiar with your playing style. The same thing applies to live games. If you have multiple options, be inclined to travel to different cardrooms. Occasionally play different limits or games altogether. The only things you need to maintain this variety are a healthy bankroll and some extra hard drive space on your computer...a pretty small price to pay to stay unknown and unpredictable.

Vary Your Play IF...

Of course, sometimes it does pay to vary your play. As the limits increase, the chances your competition will be paying attention increases. At low limits, varying your play is almost pointless, since it is rarely noted, and even if it was, it wouldn't make much of a difference due to the texture of the typical low limit game. At middle and high limits, there might be some value to 'false advertising,' but even then it depends on the length of time one spends at the table and the turnover of players. After all, if you or your opponents will not be playing in an hour, why sacrifice any short-term profit? Varying your play may also become important if you don't have choices for where to play. You might have a weekly home game with some solid players or only one casino in a 150-mile radius. If you are frequently returning to see the same group of players, then projecting a mottled image becomes valuable. Remember, many of the authors who constantly advise to "Vary your play" are in fact facing exactly these two criteria. They play high limits with a relatively small pool of players, and they play a lot. To thrive, they must deceive, confuse, and manipulate their opponents by giving up some short-term loss for the sake of long-term gain. For the rest of us, there is rarely such need.

Kommen wir nun zur Analyse der wichtigsten Statistiken:

1. Voluntary Put $ in the Pot (YP$IP)
Dieser Indikator beschreibt die Aggressivität im Spiel vor dem Flop anhand der Anzahl an $$$, die man Pre-Flop in die Mitte bringt.
Im Buch von Borer und Mak wird die optimale Range als "Tight" bezeichnet und mit einer Prozentzahl vo 23% - 35% beziffert.
Hier liege ich aufgrund meiner immer noch recht tighten Handauswahl recht gut in dieser Range. Allerdings gibt es hier auch noch Luft nach oben. Wenn ich meine Spielweise mit anderen guten Shorthanded Spielern vergleiche, könnte ich hier noch etwas looser werden, vor allem im Spiel in der Late Position.

2. Pre-Flop Raise (PFR)
Hier habe ich wohl meine größte Schwäche im Spiel. Borer und Mak bzeichnen die Prozent-Range von 17% - 25% als ideal. Ich komme hier nur auf einen Wert 13,65%.
Ich muss ehrlich sagen, dass ich schon seit einiger Zeit versuche, den Wert nach oben zu bringen., aber bei einem looseren Spiel fühle ich mich einfach nicht wohl.
Meine Handranges spiele ich mittlerweile fast blind. Dennoch muss ich es irgendwie schaffen, etwas mehr Risiko Pre-Flop einzugehen.

3. Aggression Factor (AF)
Dieser Indikator zeigt an, wie aggressiv ich nach dem Flop spiele. Borer und Mak geben eine Range von 1,5 - 2,4 als gute Range an. Ich komme bei meinem Spiel auf einen Wert von 2,4.
Ich liege damit zwar an der obersten Grenze der Range, was aber auch daran liegt, dass meine Handauswahl recht tight ist und ich somit sehr stark auf dem Flop und nach dem Flop "for Value bette".

Ansonsten bin ich meinen Monatszielen schon recht nahe. Mit fehlen noch knapp 900 VPPs, um den 240$ Bonus einzulösen und knapp 50$, um die Grenze zum Limit 2/4 zu erreichen. Das Wochenende, an dem ich mir mal recht viel Zeit für das Spiel genommen habe, lief zwar nicht ganz so optimal wie geplant, dennoch bin ich knapp 30 Big Bets im Plus. Insgesamt ist der August mit knapp 140 Big Bets und einer BB/100 Hände Wert von knapp 1.91 ganz in Ordnung.

Im Moment überlege ich mir, dass 300 Euro Turnier im Casino Duisburg mitzuspielen. Eigentlich ist das Buy-in definitiv zu hoch für meine Roll, aber es reizt halt, weil es keinen Turnier-Gebühr gibt und das gesamte Geld in den Preispool geht.
Mal sehen...!

Im nächsten Eintrag möchte ich mal ein paar Hände zur Diskussion stellen,
in diesem Sinne, keep going

Don Scots

Voy a ver una serie de videos de deucescracked para shorthanded, esperando mejorar mi juego como siempre, estoy muy enfatizado en mejorar mi juego postflop, lo que significa en mejorar las lecturas, por este motivo solo estoy jugando a 7 mesas, para tomar mejores decisiones, ya que, en algunas ocasiones estoy jugando el stack con TP o MP cuando creo que es lo correcto

Como he madurado (en el poker xD) no me excita para nada subir a NL25, teniendo bank para hacerlo, como lo tengo presupuestado, subire con 30 BI's ($750), asi que la lucha sigue en NL10

nachdem ich am Wochenende knapp 4.000 Hände gespielt habe und ich mich immer sicherer fühle, habe ich gestern den Schritt auf 1/2 unternommen.
Aber der Reihe nach:

Nachdem ich mich erstmal richtig geärgert habe, dass ich meine restliche Bankroll von Betmost Poker Sonntag Nacht auf Stars geschoben, und somit den "2x" Bonus verpasst habe, war es nun an der Zeit, den Bonus doch noch irgendwie abzugreifen.
Auscashen , um danach wieder einzucashen war keine Option, also habe ich sämtliche $$ von allen Poker- und Sportwetten-Seiten heruntergezogen und bin am Ende auf 602$ gekommen. Hat also gereicht, Bonus ist angelaufen!

Mit dem Blick auf meine nun vorhandene Roll auf Stars habe ich mich entschieden, FL SH .50/1 hinter mir zu lassen und das Limit 1/2 in Angriff zu nehmen. Genau das Limit an dem ich das letzte Mal gescheitert bin.
Ich hatte mich dazu entschlossen, trotz des Limit-Aufstiegs weiterhin vier Tische zu spielen, um mein Spielstil nicht zu verändern.
Leider liefen die für mich psychlogisch wichtigen ersten Hände recht katastrophal, so dass ich schon relativ früh ein schlechtes Gefühl hatte.
Mit der Zeit lief es aber immer besser, so dass ich die Session von knapp 400 Händen am Ende mit knapp 20BB im plus abschließen konnte.

Ich bin mit dem Ergebnis halbwegs zufrieden, allerdings war aufgrund der Starthände eigentlich mehr drin. Zweimal KK verloren, einmal Queens und einmal Set gegen Straight.
Lange Gedanken habe ich mir um folgende Hand gemacht. Hätte ich am Turn merken müssen, dass ich hinten liege?
Im Intelliforum sagen mir erfahrenere Spieler, die Hand wäre vollkommen in Ordnung gespielt. Ich frage mich nur, ob ich nicht einige BB hätte sparen können.
Aber seht selbst:

http://www.pokerhand.org/?2933771

Darüber hinaus habe ich mich entschieden, am Wochenende nicht das Turbo Takedown Turnier zu spielen und stattdessen zu grinden um meine 10.000 Hände im Monat Juli zu erreichen.
Ansonsten bin ich gespannt, ob der gute Lauf nun erstmal so weitergehen wird und wie ich auf Swings reagieren werde.
Ich hoffe, ich habe seit meinen letzten Ausflügen zum Shorthanded Spiel einiges dazu gelernt.

Regards
Don Scots

Im Mai hab ich sehr sehr wenig Haende gezockt, naemlich nur 12k. Das Ergebnis ist das:

BB:

Cash:

Tjo, das wars erstmal, ist zu warm, es ist absolut windstill und ich hab keine Lust mehr zu tippen.. deshalb Tschuessie

kono

Så var man äntligen hemma då efter årets lättvindsrace vilket också var både min och Fredriks premiär i att segla shorthanded, d.v.s med endast en eller två personer i besättningen.

Dag 1: Oxelösund - Visby, 88M
Startgrupp 5 startade 21.30. Vi var nöjda med vår start, vi tajmade linjen rätt så bra medan många var tidiga eller sena. Vi fick starta i fri vind i lovart och i den lätta vinden precis efter start fick vi snabbt bra fart med "blekeskenaren" som jag hörde båten kallas på bryggan. På tal om namn: som en del har märkt heter inte teamet Condevor längre. Ett officiellt namn är inte bestämt, men under detta race kallade vi oss Rail Runners.

Utseglingen gick via Gustaf Dahlén och sedan ned mot Visby - bägge två sträckbogar. Vi seglade till Visby för styrbord på ca 50-60 grader TWA och i ca 10 knops vind. Kanonväder att segla i och det gick också väldigt bra tyckte vi själva. Vi kom in som 10:e båt totalt på seglad tid trots att vi saknade flera meter vattenlinje mot de flesta andra i den snabbaste enskrovsgruppen. Vi mäter ju högt (LYS 1,36) baserat på båtens undanvindsegenskaper så att vi inte kan hävda oss så bra på sträckbogar är väntat, men när vi såg att vi hamnade på 51:a plats i LYS totalt börjar man ju fundera på hur det kunde bli så, men det är inte så lönt att fundera. Vi konstaterar att av topp 20 båtar på etappen totalt var 16 från de tidigare startgrupperna med mer vind. Klen tröst, men dock en tröst. Vi gick i mål vid 08.28 på morgonen och fick alltså ny starttid 14.28.

Dag 2: Visby - Borgholm, 76M
Starten på eftermiddagen i Visby blev dålig beroende på ett antal saker. Det blåste mer vilket gör det svårt att tajma eftersom båten är snabb i dessa förhållanden. Vindriktningen var väldigt sned i förhållande till linjen redan från början och när vi väl skulle starta hade det vridit så pass mycket att vi inte stod upp ett av startmärkena utan blev tvungna att slå för att komma över.

Men väl iväg så blev det...just det - sträckbog. Den här dagen skulle vi få prova babords halsar och det gick bra det också. I respitrace är det ju alltid kul om man hittar någon båt som är jämn i prestanda och på sträckbogar verkar X-35 ligga nära oss. Vi slog Go Green med 2 minuter på första sträckan vilket gjorde att vi fick 2 minuters försprång till nästa start. Så vi hade dem precis i hälarna och de tvingade oss att stå på tå i över 8-9 timmar innan vi gick skilda vägar på kryssen.

Vid rundningen av Ölands Norra grund blev det kryss ned i Kalmarsund och det tog ett tag för oss att hitta rätt i trimmet. Vi fick inte riktigt till den höjd vi ville ha och såg att X-35:an Go Green hade kvar samma fart men kunde skruva lite högre. När vinden lättade ur ännu mer hittade vi dock farten och slog på skiften. Ju mindre det blåste desto fortare seglade vi jämfört med konkurrenterna och nu plockade vi många båtar, på natten gick det fantastiskt bra. Men säg den glädje som varar. När vi har jobbat oss upp i fältet stängs fläkten av helt och vi blir liggande i ca 6 timmar några distansminuter från Borgholm i totalt bleke... till slut lyckas vi i alla fall manöverera in oss i lite vind och kommer i mål vid 10.30-tiden.

Dag 3: Borgholm - Oxelösund, 119M
Ny starttid ca 15.30, vi ger oss iväg ut från Borgholm och hissar på den gröna assyn för första gången. Vi bär den så högt vi kan då väderprognosen säger att det skall komma ny ostlig vind och vi skruvar ut oss på havet. När vi passerar rätt nära Knolls grund och det vrider ytterligare på S pekar nosen snart på Visby. Funderingarna går förstås: Håller prognosen? När kommer ny vind från O? Borde vi inte gippa nu? En koll med Expedition bekräftar att det är rätt läge att gippa. Vi gör det och börjar direkt lyfta mot Gustaf Dahlén. Med ut på havet har Wasa 41:an Aitutaki hängt med och vi börjar nu ha en privat strid. De seglar oerhört aktivt och bra med sin gennaker och tvingar oss att stå på tå precis som Go Green gjorde ner mot Kalmarsund. Nyttigt. Vinden dör ut och det går oerhört långsamt in mot Oxelösund. Vi drar ifrån Aitutaki när det kommer vind men den dör ut och de kommer ikapp igen. Vår strid håller ända in på mållinjen där de drar längsta strået efter en mycket väl utförd segling. Cred! Själva hamnade vi i en strömfåra och stod inte upp märket på mållinjen utan fick kämpa i ytterligare en halvtimme innan vi gick i mål med rumpan först... :-)

Intressant att notera är att Go Green rundade Gustaf Dahlén bara 10 minuter före oss men blev två timmar före oss i mål. Vi blev 10 snabbaste båt totalt och på sista etappen var vi näst snabbast efter Go Green och därefter kom Aitutaki. Vi är väldigt nöjda med avslutningen på racet och har fått blodad tand på detta med shorthand. Vi kommer tillbaka nästa år! Tack OXSS och Watski med samarbetspartners för ett bra arrangemang! Nästa år hoppas vi på lite bättre "mediebevakning" ute på fältet.

April in Cash:

Die Graphen sagen eigentlich schon alles, es läuft! Seit April stecke ich in einem 900BB Up.
Anfang Mai ging es dann erstmal 150 BB down, in nichtmal 1000 Händen. "Na Super!", dachte ich. Am nächsten Tag ging es aber schon wieder bergauf. :)
Auf Everest habe ich nun knappp 500BB fuer 5/10 zusammen, als ich dann gestern wieder einen Shot auf 5/10 wagte, ging es gleich mal 30 BB down; was ja nicht viel ist, aber an die höheren Beträge muss ich mich doch noch gewöhnen. Außerdem schmälert dieser, wenn auch kleine Verlust, den guten Lauf der Limits darunter, weshalb ich erstmal nicht mehr 5/10 shotten werde, solange es darunter gut läuft. .oO(macht das Sinn? Irgendwie nicht.) Vll sollte ich sagen: "..., solange es auf 3/6 genung Tische gibt."

Im Moment wird man mit Boni überschüttet, alleine auf Titan habe ich noch 1100 Boni-Dollar freizuspielen, und es gibt schon wieder einen neuen 500$ Bonus dort :).
Im Moment spiele ich noch den 275$ Bonus auf Everest frei, der am 14.5 abläuft. Mir fehlen ca. 3300 Punkte von 6500Pkt. In den letzten zwei Tagen konnte ich 1800 Punkte erspielen, was also kein größeres Problem darstellen sollte. Danach werde ich mir dann wohl Titan Dauerzoggen antun. 1600$ sollten jedoch Motivation genug sein. Für einen 500$ Bonus brauche ich 60000 Punkte. Damit ich diese Boni überhaupt in 3 Monaten schaffe, werde ich wohl direkt auf 3/6 anfangen. Aber mal sehen.
Auf Party habe ich mitlerweile ausgecashed, die haben mich so dermaßen mit Boni zu gemuellt, dass ich nichtmal Zeit hatte einen Bonus zu clearen auszucashen und neu einzuzahlen. Nein! Sie haben mir während ein Bonus noch lief (die laufen nur EINE Woche) gleich den nächsten offeriert. Party nervt mich eh total, scheiß Software, scheiß Töne, scheiß Speed-Tische, monotones Spielen durch zu viele ps.deler. Spielen macht dort wirklich keine Freude, nichtmal wenn man 'nen Up hat. Da ist Everest schon um einiges besser. Super Software, wie ich finde, schlechte Gegner, was unbestritten sein sollte, gutes Bonussystem, etc blabla. Aber ehrlich, auf Everest spiele ich sogar gerne, wenn es mal nicht so gut läuft, da das Spiel ansich dort einfach dynamischer und aufregender ist.
Naja genug geschwafelt, was fehlt noch?

Aktueller 3/6 SH Graph auf Everest, Die Breakevenphase ist vorbei!!!

Läuft halt =)

bis dahin kono

En este momento tengo de banca como $1100, con lo cual podria estar jugando nl50 sin problemas, pero el bank esta en varias salas, asi que mis metas se basaran en lo reunido en una sola sala, para esta ocasion sera fulltilt, ya que, aun me queda algo del bono y ademas tengo rakeback, asi q veremos como andamos ahi

En estos momentos estoy con $497, y mi idea para subir de levels son asi

NL50 -> 25 buyins

NL100 -> 30 buyins

NL200 -> 50 buyins

Tratare de respetarlo lo mas que pueda (lo se soy un gambler empedernido) pero estoy aprendiendo bastante y quiero seguir aprendiendo

Dentro del meta's system, tambien habra otra meta, como los que leen mi blog saben, no tengo tiempo para jugar como quisiera, y se que jugar pocas manos es perder dinero, asi que para mayo, mi meta sera jugar la increible suma de

22000 manos !!!

se que es un mierda pero en comparacion a lo que juego estoy doblando mi promedio asi que debo analizar bien como lo hago xD

Bank $497

Para NL50 falta $753

doccy

stats

76/12/2 ~ 114 manos

ejemplo de sus manos ganadoras
$0.1/$0.25 No Limit Holdem
6 players
Converted at weaktight.com


Stacks:

UTG		($43.65)
UTG+1		($26.95)
Hero		($25.00)
BTN		($51.70)
SB		($25.00)
BB		($65.15)

Pre-flop: ($0.35, 6 players) Hero is CO

UTG calls $0.25, 1 fold, Hero folds, BTN raises to $1.1, 1 fold, BB calls $0.85, UTG calls $0.85

Flop: ($3.4, 3 players)
BB checks, UTG bets $3.4, BTN calls $3.4, BB folds

Turn: ($10.2, 2 players)
UTG checks, BTN checks

River: ($10.2, 2 players)
UTG bets $3.75, BTN raises to $9, UTG calls $5.25

Final Pot: $28.20
BTN shows:
UTG shows:

UTG wins $26.8 ( won +$13.3 )
BTN lost -$13.50
BB lost -$1.10

$0.1/$0.25 No Limit Holdem
6 players
Converted at weaktight.com


Stacks:

UTG		($25.35)
UTG+1		($38.90)
CO		($55.40)
BTN		($24.65)
Hero		($25.00)
BB		($25.00)

Pre-flop: ($0.35, 6 players) Hero is SB

UTG raises to $0.85, 1 fold, CO calls $0.85, 1 fold, Hero folds, BB calls $0.6

Flop: ($2.65, 3 players)
BB bets $2.65, 1 fold, CO raises to $5.3, BB calls $2.65

Turn: ($13.25, 2 players)
BB checks, CO checks

River: ($13.25, 2 players)
BB checks, CO bets $3.5, BB calls $3.5

Final Pot: $20.25
BB shows:
CO shows:

CO wins $19.25 ( won +$9.6 )
BB lost -$9.65
UTG lost -$0.85

Que hacemos contra este tipo de animalitos?
una contra mi
$0.1/$0.25 No Limit Holdem
6 players
Converted at weaktight.com


Stacks:

UTG		($37.35)
UTG+1		($25.90)
CO		($63.95)
BTN		($55.25)
SB		($28.55)
Hero		($25.00)

Pre-flop: ($0.35, 6 players) Hero is BB

3 folds, BTN calls $0.25, 1 fold, Hero raises to $0.85, BTN calls $0.6

Flop: ($1.8, 2 players)
Hero bets $1.25, BTN calls $1.25

Turn: ($4.3, 2 players)
Hero checks, BTN bets $1.75, Hero calls $1.75

River: ($7.8, 2 players)
Hero checks, BTN checks

Final Pot: $7.80
Hero shows:
BTN shows:

BTN wins $7.45 ( won +$3.6 )
Hero lost -$3.85

Entonces que hago contra este tipo de animal?, estaba en estado check/fold si no conectaba, baje mis raise preflop ya que si no conectaba y ante cbet me pagaba con cualquier par conectado metia psb sin problemas. la solucion es mas facil de lo que creemos, PACIENCIA, asi es, no nos sintamos amenzados por esta clase de jugadores, ya que, siempre, pero SIEMPRE perderan al largo plazo, su estilo de juego es totalmente -EV, no porque en una mesa esten deepstack con 5 buyins significa que su juego es bueno, solo significa que tuvo suerte en ese rato, lo mejor que podemos hacer aca es esperar la mano y stackearlo que tengan por seguro que teniendo bottom pair le dejaran la caja ante un donk

primer intento
$0.1/$0.25 No Limit Holdem
5 players
Converted at weaktight.com


Stacks:

UTG	gore nis	($66.00)
CO	Doccy	($63.85)
BTN	Hero	($31.55)
SB	TheDangler23	($28.85)
BB	pasnia	($25.00)

Pre-flop: ($0.35, 5 players) Hero is BTN

gore nis raises to $1, Doccy calls $1, Hero calls $1, 2 folds

Flop: ($3.35, 3 players)
gore nis checks, Doccy checks, Hero checks

Turn: ($3.35, 3 players)
gore nis checks, Doccy bets $0.75, Hero raises to $1.5, gore nis folds, Doccy calls $0.75

River: ($6.35, 2 players)
Doccy checks, Hero bets $4, Doccy folds

Final Pot: $6.35

Hero wins $10.05 ( won +$3.55 )
gore nis lost -$1.00
Doccy lost -$2.50

owned

$0.1/$0.25 No Limit Holdem
6 players
Converted at weaktight.com


Stacks:

UTG		($52.40)
Hero		($35.00)
CO		($29.10)
BTN		($25.00)
SB		($25.00)
BB		($56.60)

Pre-flop: ($0.35, 6 players) Hero is UTG+1

1 fold, Hero calls $0.25, 3 folds, BB checks

Flop: ($0.6, 2 players)
BB checks, Hero bets $0.5, BB calls $0.5

Turn: ($1.6, 2 players)
BB checks, Hero bets $1, BB calls $1

River: ($3.6, 2 players)
BB checks, Hero bets $3.6, BB raises to $7.2, Hero goes all-in $33.25, BB calls $26.05

Final Pot: $70.10
Hero shows:
BB shows:

Hero wins $67.1 ( won +$32.1 )
BB lost -$35.00

el punto es el siguiente, esta gente no GANA...ni a corto ni largo ni nada, solo hay q esperarlo para stackearlos, aumenten su rango de manos y soft postflop si no conectan

saludos

Estoy leyendo el siguiente documento "Ryan Fee's 6 Max NL Strategy Guide", el cual es un analisis a travez de la trayectoria de la mano por cada situacion y en cada posicion de la mesa, al leer algo de esto, he coincidido en varios conceptos los cuales ya tenia aprendiendo, pero ahora ademas estoy agregando el concepto de cambio de juego segun el tipo de mesa y el tipo de rival, que en eso estaba muy pobre, es un documento de lujo (gratis) que no se puede dejar pasar, pasen por su web, lean el documento y agradezcan por semejante trabajo gratuito http://www.ryanfee.com

Como no estoy jugando en noiqpoker, le estoy dando en fulltilt, de lo cual ya llevo 4 sesiones en positivo, con el tipico badbeat de FTP AA vs KK(set) pero contento con mi juego, como ya no puedo jugar en mi trabajo :( ahora me dedico solo a aprender, que ahora que lo pienso es mas importante que multitablear 24 mesas....

proximo post: pokerstrategy...no se lo pierdan ;)

so long ..
kono